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ABSTRACT




Recently, universal labor standards have become the focus of
intense international debate. This paper analyzes the
arguments concerning the value of coordinating labor
standards internationally, the arena in which international
labor standards ought to be established and the instruments
that can be used constructively to bring about compliance.
We examine the analytical underpinnings of universal rules;
the evidence on whether labor practices in developing
countries have adverse consequences for workers in
industrialized countries; and the question of whether labor
standards should be introduced into the negotiations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) or remain in the purview of
the ILO.
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During the past decade, universal labor standards have become
the focus of intense debate among policymakers, international
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, college campus activists
and the general public.  Tension over labor standards has
sometimes erupted into violent conflict between police and
demonstrators, most recently during the Spring 2001 Conference of
the Americas in Quebec.
Labor rights activists argue that the nations of the world
ought to be able to agree on some set of universally accepted
human rights regarding working conditions that would apply in all
nations. In addition, trade with countries in which labor is
poorly protected may create an incentive to lower wages in
industrialized countries and weaken existing labor law in order to
maintain competitiveness in international trade.  As a remedy,
some proponents seek to protect the interests of labor by
incorporating labor rights into international trade law.
Opponents of internationally established labor standards
respond that the regulation of labor markets, as a matter of
national sovereignty, should remain primarily in the domain of
domestic policy and should not be a topic in international trade2
negotiations.  The promulgation of standards internationally ought
to be delegated to the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
advanced exclusively through dialogue, monitoring and technical
advice.
Our purpose here is to analyze the arguments concerning the
value of coordinating labor standards internationally, the arena
in which international labor standards ought to be established and
the instruments that can be used constructively to bring about
compliance. We will examine the analytical underpinnings of
universal rules for labor rights; the evidence on whether labor
practices in developing countries have adverse consequences for
workers in industrialized countries; and the question of whether
labor standards should be introduced formally into the
negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or remain
primarily in the purview of the ILO.
  
Labor Standards Defined: Rights, Outcomes, Efficiency
The regulation of labor markets originally emerged before the
fourteenth century in Europe with laws generally written to serve
the interests of the elite rather than to protect labor.
1 
However, with the onset of the industrial revolution, social
activists began advocating for labor protections that might3
mitigate the more brutal aspects of industrialization.  Engerman
(2001) marks the beginning of the modern labor rights movement
with the English Factory Act of 1802.  This act regulates the
working conditions of pauper apprentices, establishing a twelve-
hour day, prohibiting night work and providing for basic academic
and religious training.
From its inception, the debate over labor rights addressed
the legitimate right of the government to intrude upon market
outcomes and the free choices of workers.  Thus, most of the
legislation in Europe and North America throughout the 19
th century
focused only on regulating the working conditions of women and
children with the intention of offsetting their weak bargaining
power with employers.  Legislation typically controlled the length
of the workday and night-work and prohibited the employment of
women in hazardous conditions such as underground mines.
A second thread common to our current debate concerned the
importance of international coordination of labor law in order to
mitigate the effects of labor protections on trade
competitiveness.
2  The drive to coordinate labor practices
internationally began during the second half of the 19
th century.
However, success was limited largely to the prohibition of
production and importation of white phosphorous matches and night
work by women.4
The international labor rights agenda broadened dramatically
at the end of World War I with the creation of the International
Labour Organization. The ILO was established in 1919 as an
offshoot of the League of Nations and originally had 44 member
countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.  Initially,
discussions in the ILO focused on the eradication of slavery and
all forms of forced labor. However, a broader labor rights agenda
also included the rights to freedom of association and collective
bargaining, nondiscrimination in employment, and the elimination
of child labor (ILO, 1999).
As part of building an international consensus on labor
standards, the ILO promulgates certain "Conventions" and
“Recommendation” which member nations may choose to ratify.  The
early Conventions adopted between 1919 and 1939 included a long
list of labor market practices targeted for international
standards.  For example, Convention 1 establishes the 8-hour
day/48-hour workweek and Convention 5 establishes a minimum work
age of 14 years
3.  Additional Conventions and Recommendations
pertained to wages, occupational health and safety, retirement
compensation, severance pay, survivor's benefits, etc.
The Critique of International Labor Standards
In the face of the lengthy list of labor standards5
contemplated by the ILO, critics of international labor standards
point out the unfairness of attempting to establish standards in
all of these areas without regard for the level of economic
development and cultural norms.  While most countries may be
willing to embrace the broad caveat-filled language typical of ILO
Conventions, that does not imply that we will be able to agree on
specific language pertaining to labor standards that would then be
subject to trade disciplines in the World Trade Organization.
For example, there is strong empirical evidence that the
optimal length of the workweek is negatively correlated with a
nation's level of income; that is, high-income countries have a
shorter workweek than many low-income countries.  See, for
example, Table 1, which reports on typical workweeks, wages and
labor costs for a select group of countries for manufacturing,
agriculture and wearing apparel.  Note, for example, that in Costa
Rica a typical worker in manufacturing earned $1.54/hour and
worked 49 hours a week in 1999.  Some textile and wearing apparel
workers earning less than $1/hour worked 50 or more hours per
week.  By contrast, a typical manufacturing worker in the United
States earned $13.91/hour and worked 41.7 hours a week in 1999. 
Similarly, a suitable minimum wage cannot be set uniformly since
its effects will depends critically on how high it is relative to
the productivity of less-skilled labor.6
Child labor practices, which receive the most intensive
scrutiny in the public discussions, clearly depend on the level of
economic development and for many families the income earned by
their children is a matter of the family's survival.  Krueger
(1997) finds a very strong negative correlation between child
labor force participation and per capita GDP.  Children 14 years
and younger are not completely withdrawn from the labor force
until GDP approaches $5000 per capita.
4
Virtually every country in the world attempts to regulate
child labor by setting minimum educational requirements and
minimum age of employment, though with limited success. 
Regulations along with child labor force participation rates for a
select group of countries are reported in Table 2.  For countries
in the poorest parts of the world, more than 40 percent of
children aged 5-14 work.  This is the case even though the legal
minimum age of work is typically 14 years old or higher and in no
case is the minimum work age less than 12 years.
Core Labor Standards as Basic Human Rights
There have been several responses to the concerns raised by
the labor standards critics. First, even if a global minimum wage
applying across all countries seems nonsensical, there are still
certain "core standards" that should be imposed universally7
because they are arguably independent of national income and
reflect natural rights or broadly held values.  A second line of
argument holds that certain basic labor standards will have
positive economic effects and can be justified on these grounds.
Cast in these terms, the discussion of core labor standards
is closely related to the on-going debate in political science and
philosophy over the notion of natural rights. Some prefer to avoid
the language of "rights," but instead argue that something of a
consensus has emerged on a broader set of values that are derived
from the notion of individual freedom (Maskus, 1997). 
Such rights-based or value-based language appears in the
charters and declarations of several international organizations
that include nearly all countries in the world in their
membership. For example, The ILO Conventions pertaining to core
labor standards, listed in Table 3, have been ratified by well
over 100 countries and similar United Nations covenants have been
ratified by more than 120 countries.  Furthermore, The 1998 ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles at Work
5 binds all 175 ILO
members and states that
" ... all Members, even if they have not ratified the
Conventions in question, have an obligation arising
from the very fact of membership in the Organization,8
to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith
and in accordance with the Constitution, the Principles
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject
of those Conventions, namely:
1. freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the  right to collective bargaining,
2. the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor,
3. the effective abolition of child labor, and
4. the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation.
Thus, proponents argue that the ILO and UN language can be viewed
as a near universally accepted set of humanitarian principles
concerning the treatment of labor (Eddy, 1997).
Of course, the fact that an ILO document refers to
"fundamental rights" does not end the discussion.  Bhagwati (1995)
has been a prominent voice among those arguing that in the area of
labor standards, there is little universal agreement.  We have a
near-universal consensus only in favor of prohibiting forced
labor.
6 On other issues, like the appropriate rules to regulate
collective bargaining or child labor or discrimination, we have a
mixture of good intentions, some blood-curdling stories about9
undoubted abuses in extreme cases, and great uncertainty over what
the appropriate labor standard should be.
Some statements about labor standards may be attractive
general goals, but they vary too much across countries to be
defined as rights.  Even the United States, which has been a
driving force behind the recent international labor standards
initiative has not ratified any of the ILO Conventions pertaining
to nondiscrimination, forced labor or the right to free
association and collective bargaining, as can be seen from Table
3. Similarly, the debate over what constitutes “the elimination of
discrimination” has proceeded for decades inconclusively.  At this
point there appears little closure on the issue.
Labor Process Standards
To avoid the intellectual quagmire of natural rights, other
organizing principles have been proposed.  For example, Aggarwal
(1995) distinguishes labor market standards that are focused on
outcomes from those that are focused on processes. Outcome-related
standards, like a minimum wage, will always depend on levels of
productivity and economic development and, thus, are poor
candidates for international standards.  By contrast, the core
labor standards listed in the 1998 ILO Declaration are largely
process-related; that is, they concern the organization of the10
labor market without specifying any particular market outcome.  If
we adopt the “process” approach, the question becomes what labor
standards should be regulated and how?
      An OECD (1996) report isolates labor standards that reflect
near universally held values and/or play a role in supporting the
efficient function of labor markets. According to this view,
standards such as freedom of association, the right to collective
bargaining, prohibition of forced labor, the principle of
nondiscrimination and prohibition of "exploitative" child labor
can be imposed without regard to the degree of development and can
actually promote economic growth.
While it would be convenient if efficiency-enhancing labor
standards could be linked to humanitarian values, these
connections are often ambiguous and controversial.  Consider first
the prohibition against forced labor.  The consensus against
slavery or labor contracts that lead to slave-like conditions is
one point on which there is virtually no debate.  Although it is
possible to make an efficiency argument supporting the prohibition
of forced labor, e.g., Swinnerton (1997), humanitarian concerns
typically dwarf any discussion of efficiency.
The grey area concerns bonded labor contracts prohibited
under ILO Convention 105.  As noted by Singh (2001), the act of
choosing to be bonded may be voluntary but once bonded the worker11
is no longer free.  Genicot (2000) emphasizes the role of capital
market failure in bonded labor contracts.  Extremely poor workers
frequently have no access to formal capital markets and, so, are
forced to offer their own labor as collateral to obtain a loan.
Such arrangements may be mutually agreed upon by the worker
and the employer, at least ex ante.  Nevertheless, banning such
contracts may be justified if they result from limited information
or rationality on the part of the worker.
Genicot further argues that the legality of bonded labor
contracts may actually inhibit the development of formal capital
markets.  He points out that a bank may be unwilling to extend a
loan if the worker has the option of obtaining a second loan by
bonding his labor.  Presumably, the bondholder has greater power
to enforce the loan agreement than the bank, thereby raising the
default risk for the bank.  In such cases, outlawing bonded labor
contracts can actually improve the options for the worker by
lowering the default risk for formal credit institutions. 
Standard efficiency arguments are also weakened when we are
constrained by political feasibility.  Take, for example,
discrimination in employment. Discrimination discourages workers
from entering the job to which they are best suited, thereby
lowering the value of output.  However, Rodrik (1999) offers a
striking example in which discrimination was Pareto-improving for12
political economy reasons.
Mauritius set out on a development strategy that depended on
operating an export-processing zone. To generate a consensus in
support of the export-oriented development strategy, the interests
of those benefiting from long-standing protection had to be
preserved.  This was accomplished by following a two-part
development strategy: protection for existing industries that
hired males was continued, while the export-processing zones
employed females. Rodrik argues that the segmentation of the labor
force along gender lines was critical to the policy's success. 
Male workers and import-competing producers continued to produce
under the same conditions as before the introduction of the
export-promotion plan, while women and capital owners in the
export-processing zones had new opportunities opened to them.  In
Rodrik’s words (p. 21): "New profit opportunities were created at
the margin, while leaving old opportunities undisturbed."  Thus,
the Pareto-improving step was rendered politically feasible by
segmenting the labor market along gender lines.  Dealing with
entrenched cultural patterns that have favored one group over
another may sometimes lead to advocacy of policies – either
preserving some of the benefits to the favored group or assuring
benefits to the disfavored group – that would not pass a strict
non-discrimination test.13
The expected outcome of collective bargaining is similarly
uncertain. As argued by Freeman (1994), unionism has two faces. In
many cases, a union can improve dispute resolution, provide a
channel of information from worker to employer, and coordinate the
differing views among workers concerning the tradeoff between
working conditions and wages (for a view of unions along these
lines, see Stiglitz, 2000, Piore, 1994, and Marshall, 1994).
However, if the union behaves like a monopoly in an otherwise
competitive market, favoring the interests of a small elite at the
expense of a large group of excluded workers, then the efficiency
effects are negative (Bhagwati, 1995; Srinivasan, 1997).  
Finally, the OECD (1996) report seeks to include the
prohibition of "exploitative" child labor as a core standard. 
Indeed, the specter of small children working long hours in
appalling conditions motivate most analysts to find some
analytical basis on which to at least circumscribe labor practices
concerning children.
Bonded child labor is frequently put forward as the most
egregious and offensive form of exploitative child labor. 
Children delivered into bonded servitude are sometimes clothed,
housed and fed by their employer and they may receive only a very
small wage.  The excess product generated by the child's work that
is not devoted to the child's support is paid to the parent who14
receives a lump sum at the time the child is delivered into
servitude.  That is, the child must be subsidizing the standard of
living of the rest of the family and thus is exploited in this
sense (Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 2001).
Although the OECD (1996) report focuses on “exploitative”
child labor, it is possible to make an argument for banning child
labor more broadly defined on both equity and efficiency grounds.
7
 Basu and Van (1998) analyze the case of families who put their
children to work only when the adult wage is below some critical
level at which the family’s survival is threatened.  When child
labor decisions depend on the adult wage in this manner, two labor
market equilibria may emerge.
In the low-wage child-labor equilibrium, both children and
their parents work because the adult wage is below the critical
level at which children are withdrawn from the labor market.  A
ban on child labor that requires parents to withdraw their
children from the labor force contracts the supply of labor and
may give rise to an equilibrium adult wage above the critical
level at which children no longer work.  The ban on child labor is
effective when it redistributes income from capital to labor in
such a way as to alter the family’s child-labor decisions.
Although much attention is focused on poverty as the root
cause of child labor, Baland and Robinson (2000) refocus on the15
role of capital market failure.  Presumably, poor families analyze
the trade-off between work and schooling in part by comparing the
present discounted value of an education to the income from
current work.  It is arguably the case that the relative return to
education is as high or higher for a poor child than for children
generally.  However, poor parents may still choose to put their
child to work if they cannot borrow against their educated child’s
future income.
8  In this situation, a ban on child labor may be
part of a constructive strategy for improving the efficiency of
the labor market when combined with a program that provides poor
families access to capital markets or otherwise repairs the
capital market failure.
9
Taking steps to reduce forced labor, child labor, and
discriminatory behavior, or to support free association and
collective bargaining will often have a mixture of effects.
Realizing the potential efficiency, equity and humanitarian
benefits of core standards may depend on first correcting
ancillary market or political failures.  Further, we cannot make a
general statement that universal labor standards derived from
commonly held moral values will always produce positive economic
outcomes. The effect on economic performance and the lives of
workers and their families of legally imposed labor market
constraints of the sort contemplated by labor rights activists16
cannot be presumed to be positive, but instead must be empirically
investigated on a country-by-country basis.
Divergent Labor Standards, Trade and Wages of Unskilled Workers in
High-Income Countries
While humanitarian concerns have played a prominent role in
the debate over international labor standards, a second motivation
rests on the view that trade with low-wage countries has increased
unemployment and slowed the growth in wages of unskilled workers
in high-income countries over the past three decades. To the
extent that low labor cost in developing countries is the result
of poorly protected core labor rights, trade based on low wages is
sometimes seen as unfair or illegitimate.
As a matter of theory, poorly protected worker rights in one
country can assuredly lower the wages in their trade partner. 
According to the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) Theorem, international
trade between a high-wage and low-wage country will lower the
return to unskilled labor in the high-wage country.  But to what
extent is the decline in the return to unskilled labor in the
United States in the last few decades the result of international
trade with low-wage countries? Further, to what extent is such
trade the consequence of low labor standards?17
  
Has Trade Lowered the Return to Unskilled Labor in the United
States over the Past Two Decades?
There appear to be two primary candidates driving the rise in
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the United
States in recent decades. Skill-biased technical change,
presumably associated with the new information and communications
technologies, would shift up the demand for skilled workers.
However, labor rights activists focus on the expansion of
international trade with low-wage economies which tended to reduce
the demand for low-skilled labor in the United States.
A number of pieces of evidence suggest that an important
shift toward skill-biased technological change has indeed
occurred. For example, the relative supply of skilled labor did
expand throughout the 1980s even as the relative wage of skilled
labor increased, which suggests that firms were moving up along
the skilled-labor supply curve, paying higher wages and adopting a
more skill-intensive technique of production (Bound and Johnson,
1992). Similarly, throughout the 1980s, U.S. manufacturing
consistently substituted toward skilled labor in spite of its
rising costs (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993).  Such a pattern of
behavior is cost-minimizing only if there has been a technological
change rendering skilled labor relatively more productive. The18
greater demand for skilled labor seems to have occurred more as a
broad-based shift within many sectors of the economy rather than
arising only in certain labor-intensive sectors. Such evidence is
consistent with skill-biased technological change that drives up
the demand for skill in all sectors (Berman, Bound and Griliches,
1994). Finally, there is little evidence that the relative price
of labor-intensive goods fell during the 1980s, as one would
expect if imports from low-income countries were undercutting
less-skilled U.S. labor (Leamer, 1996). 
Nevertheless, a number of economists continue to believe that
international trade is responsible, at least in part, for the
recent decline in the relative wages of unskilled workers in the
United States.  As one example, Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992)
calculate the factor supplies embodied in U.S. international trade
and immigration.  They find that for 1985-1986, trade and
immigration implicitly increased the supply of workers with a
skill level equivalent to a high school dropout in the United
States by 27 percent, whereas the comparable number for college
graduates was 9 percent.  They use a wage equation to relate the
implicit change in relative factor supplies to a change in
relative wages and conclude that trade and immigration gave rise
to a 2 percent increase in the college graduate wage premium which
was 20 percent of the total change in the college premium during19
the period.
10
Choosing between skill-biased technology and trade as
explanations for the rise in income inequality is further
complicated by the reality that these factors may be intertwined;
that is, technological improvements may both increase the demand
for skilled labor and also increase imports from low-wage
countries by making it easier to manage far-flung supply chains. 
The controversy over trade and the distribution of income
continues.
11 However, at this point, the bulk of the evidence
supports the argument that skill-biased technological change is
more important than trade as an explanation of wage inequality in
the United States, although rising levels of trade with low-income
countries may have played a secondary role.
Do National Labor Standards Alter Exports, Competitiveness or
Comparative Advantage?
With regard to the issue of international labor standards,
the question is whether poorly protected labor rights have played
a role in determining comparative advantage and driving exports
from developing countries.
Several studies have examined a simple correlation between
the existence and/or observance of core labor standards and
various measures of trade performance. For example, Mah (1997)20
analyzes the trade performance of 45 developing countries and
finds that each country’s export share of GDP is strongly
negatively correlated with rights to nondiscrimination, negatively
correlated with freedom-of-association rights and weakly
negatively correlated with the right to organize and collective
bargaining.
However, to gauge the marginal contribution of core labor
standards, one must compare each country's trade performance
against a baseline expectation as to what such a country should be
trading given its factor endowments and other determinants of
trade.  Rodrik (1996) provides an excellent example of how such
analysis can be undertaken.
He first considers the impact of core labor standards on
labor costs per worker in manufacturing.  He does this by
calculating a regression using labor cost as the dependent
variable and per capita income and various measures of labor
standards as the independent variables. In this framework, per
capita income is being used as a proxy for productivity in the
economy.  Labor standards are measured in a variety of ways: total
number of ILO conventions ratified; number of ILO conventions
ratified pertaining to labor standards; Freedom House indicators
of civil liberties and political rights; statutory hours worked;
days of paid annual leave; the unionization rate; and an indicator21
of child labor.
    Rodrik finds that for the period 1985-1988, labor costs are
overwhelmingly determined by labor productivity.  However, the
number of ILO conventions ratified, Freedom House indicators of
democracy and the index of child labor are large and statistically
significant, with laws regulating child labor playing a
particularly important role in determining labor costs.
Rodrik then turns to the determinants of comparative
advantage in labor-intensive goods.  He uses the fraction of
textiles and clothing exports in total exports as a proxy for
measuring comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods. As a
theoretical matter, comparative advantage is primarily determined
by factor endowments.  Therefore, the comparative advantage
variable is regressed on the independent variables of population-
to-land ratio (a measure of the labor endowment), average years of
schooling in the population over 25 (a measure of the stock of
human capital) and the labor standards variables.  The population
and human capital variables have the expected signs and are
statistically significant.  However, generally the labor standards
variables, while having the expected sign, are not statistically
significant.  The lone exception is statutory hours worked.  The
longer the workweek, the stronger is the comparative advantage in
textiles and clothing.22
Overall, the link from low labor standards in low-income
countries to the wage of unskilled workers in industrialized
countries is not especially strong. Increased global trade is at
most a secondary cause of income inequality in high-income
countries and labor standards are at most a secondary determinant
of wages in low-income countries.  Moreover, this evidence begs
the question as to whether externally-imposed labor standards will
actually affect labor market practices in developing countries
(Brown, 2000).  Some evidence on this question is discussed below.
Competition between Labor Standards and the Risk of a Race to the
Bottom
Proponents of international coordination of core labor
standards further argue that, in the absence of coordination, each
country might lower its own standards in an attempt to be more
attractive to foreign investment or to gain a competitive
advantage over foreign exporters.  The possibility of a prisoner's
dilemma outcome arises, in which each country has an individual
incentive to adopt low labor standards but all nations could
benefit from a coordinated choice of higher labor standards.
This scenario raises several questions. How powerful is this23
incentive to diminish labor standards?  Must core labor standards
be harmonized according to a universal guideline or will some more
limited coordination be more effective?  Should the responsibility
of promulgating standards and monitoring labor practices remain
with the ILO or should the trade disciplines of the WTO be brought
to bear on countries with low labor standards?
The Race to the Bottom
      Those most concerned with a prisoner's dilemma in labor
protections couch their arguments in terms of a "race to the
bottom" in which governments may be pressured to loosen labor
protections so as not to hamper domestic firms that are competing
in the international arena.  This line of argument implies that
international trade and labor standards are inextricably linked
and, therefore, should be negotiated simultaneously within the
WTO.
To understand the political economy of this race to the
bottom, consider in the spirit of Brown, Deardorff and Stern
(1996), the situation of a country that wishes to impose new labor
standards on an import-competing sector of the economy.  For a
small country, the price of the good is fixed on world markets. 
Consequently, the cost of the labor standard must be borne solely
by domestic producers, who have no power to pass the cost of the24
regulation on to consumers. However, if all countries impose the
new labor standard, global supply for the product declines,
allowing firms in this sector worldwide to raise their price.  In
this case, consumers end up bearing some of the cost.  Thus, with
coordination, the political objection to the labor standards
legislation by domestic producers will be less intense, enhancing
the chances of passage.
It is important to note for the purposes of the following
discussion that this country pays a price for relying on
international coordination to discipline the domestic political
process.  Harmonization is effective in transferring some of the
cost of the labor standard from the producer to the consumer
precisely because it raises the international price of the
imported good.  In other words, this country suffers a
deterioration in its terms of trade with harmonization, i.e.,
higher prices for its imports and lower prices for its exports.
International Trade and Some Surprising Incentives for Higher
Labor Standards
At first blush the forces driving a race to the bottom in
international standards may seem obvious.  However, all countries
have an incentive to at least consider the efficiency properties
of their labor market policies.  We need to consider, then, how25
international trade alters the political and economic incentives
to pursue efficiency-enhancing domestic policies, such as labor
standards (Srinivasan, 1998).  As it turns out, trade provides at
least some incentives for both high-income and low-income
countries to choose higher labor standards.
Consider first standards-setting in a high-income country.
Bagwell and Staiger (1998) analyze a situation in which a
government's rationale for establishing labor standards is, at
least in part, driven by the true social benefits and costs of
such standards.  For example, the decision to raise the minimum
age of employment by one year reflects an attempt to balance the
social benefits of greater educational attainment and the social
cost of the foregone production of young workers.
In this situation, when a high-income economy opens to trade,
goods formerly produced by inexperienced and low-skilled young
workers can now be replaced with low-priced imports.  Thus,
opening to trade creates an incentive, because of the reduced
opportunity cost, to tighten rather than relax labor standards in
the high-income country.
Next, consider the effect that international trade has on the
incentives to set labor standards in developing countries. Brown,
Deardorff and Stern (1996) point out that low-income countries
are, typically, labor abundant.  They make the plausible26
assumption that higher labor standards are "labor using," which
means that a tightening of world labor standards will contract the
world supply of labor. Wages worldwide rise, pushing up the price
of labor-intensive goods exported by developing countries.  The
change in the terms of trade serves the interests of the labor
abundant developing countries at the expense of industrialized
countries that are physical and human capital abundant. 
Therefore, developing countries, as a group, have an incentive to
over-protect labor.
This analysis does not suggest that labor standards in
developing countries will be higher than in industrialized
countries, but only that developing countries with market power in
international trade might have higher-than-expected labor
standards given their level of economic development.  More
importantly, when labor standards are used in this way to gain a
strategic advantage over the terms of trade, the policy is
welfare-reducing from a world point of view.  A low-income country
that uses labor standards for strategic purposes is surrendering
efficiency in order to bring about higher export prices.  However,
from a world point-of-view, the terms-of-trade effects are zero-
sum.  The terms-of-trade gain for the labor-abundant country comes
at the expense of their labor-scarce trade partners.  Thus, on
balance, the efficiency effect is negative.   27
  
The Race to the Bottom Revisited
Given the conflicting incentives, where can we find a race to
the bottom that is broadly consistent with optimizing behavior on
the part of governments? 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) point out that lower labor
standards may be used to gain a strategic advantage in
international trade or to accomplish domestic political objectives
when tariffs are also being used to restrict trade.  Labor
standards, like tariffs, have implications for the international
terms of trade and for the well-being of import-competing firms
and, thus, are policy substitutes.
For example, an import tariff provides relief to import-
competing producers from the pressure of foreign imports by
raising the landed price of imports.  A reduction in labor
standards similarly provides relief by lowering labor cost for
import-competing producers.  Both policies expand production by
import-competing firms, which has the additional affect of
lowering the demand for imports.  If the country has international
market power, the contraction in the demand for imports will also
reduce the world price of imports, giving rise to a terms-of-trade
improvement.  
When countries remove tariffs and other barriers to trade in28
the context of international trade negotiations, they give up the
policy tools normally used to turn the terms of trade to their
advantage and to protect their import-competing producers.  These
protectionist urges are thus deflected onto domestic policies such
as labor standards.  Consequently, some mechanism for controlling
subsequent competition in domestic policies is necessary if WTO
members are to realize the full benefits of trade liberalization.
Labor Standards in International Negotiations
The strategic interaction between tariffs and labor standards
raises the question of whether or how labor standards might be
included in the negotiations of the WTO. A recent review of trade
law by the OECD (1996) considered various ways of trying to link
labor standards to existing WTO rules.
12  However, the OECD report
found that in each case, either low labor standards do not meet
the technical requirements of the article and/or the WTO does not
provide for an enforcement mechanism.  As a consequence, some
revision to the WTO charter will be required if low labor
standards are to be addressed directly.
Opponents of a "social clause" in the WTO warn of a morass
that will emerge if governments attempt to negotiate trade and
domestic policy simultaneously.  Concerns for domestic autonomy,29
to say nothing of complexity, could bring the WTO process to its
knees.  However, because of the strategic interaction between
tariffs and labor standards discussed in the previous section, the
"benign neglect" of labor standards in the WTO is also a potential
source of inefficient bargaining over trade policy (Bagwell and
Staiger, 1998).
Remarkably, Bagwell and Staiger find a clever device for
implicitly drawing domestic policies into the WTO framework
without having to negotiate over domestic policies directly.  As
they argue in this symposium, when governments negotiate over
tariffs in the WTO, they are implicitly making a commitment to a
particular level of market access.  This is the case because,
under GATT Article XXIII, any country in the WTO is entitled to
"right of redress" for changes in domestic policy that
systematically erode market access commitments even if no explicit
GATT rule has been violated.  Such a "non-violation" complaint
entitles the aggrieved party either to compensation in the form of
other tariff concessions to "rebalance" market access commitments
or the complaining partner may withdraw equivalent concessions of
its own.
In the context of labor standards, any country that attempts
to undue its market access commitments made in a round of WTO
negotiations may be required to provide additional trade30
concessions to restore the originally agreed-upon market access
commitments.  As a consequence, no government has the ability to
pass the cost or benefit of their labor standards onto the rest of
the world or achieve a strategic advantage by altering their labor
standards.
Of course, a change in labor standards policy may expand, as
well as contract, market access.  Thus, in order to achieve
symmetry, GATT Article XXIII would have to be amended to allow
countries that expand market access as a consequence of changes in
domestic policy to subsequently retract some tariff concessions
that restore the original market access commitments.
We can gain an intuitive feel for the Bagwell-Staiger
mechanism by returning to the race to the bottom presented above.
 Recall that some governments have a political economy incentive
to seek stricter labor standards internationally to offset the
cost of domestic labor standards for their import-competing
producers.  An internationally coordinated labor standard could
provide relief to domestic producers, since it reduces worldwide
production of the labor-intensive good, thereby raising its price
on the world market.  However, under the tariff negotiating
scenario envisioned by Bagwell and Staiger, a country that raises
its labor standards, thereby increasing import demand, would be
entitled to a tariff increase that returns market access to the31
originally agreed-upon level.
Note that a high-income country will prefer the Bagwell-
Staiger mechanism to the strategy of harmonizing labor standards
internationally.  Both provide relief to domestic producers by
raising the landed price of imports.  However, harmonization
entails a deterioration in the terms of trade and requires all
countries to agree upon a single standard.  By contrast, the
Bagwell-Staiger mechanism does not alter the terms of trade and
leaves all countries with the option of setting their labor
standards in the manner that serves their own economic and
domestic political interests.
The essential feature of the Bagwell-Staiger mechanism is
that it requires each country to neutralize the international
economic repercussions of its domestic policy decisions.  As a
consequence, countries are not tempted to sacrifice socially
desirable labor market policies in order to achieve zero-sum
terms-of-trade gains. Perhaps more importantly, each government is
also given the ability to offset some of the distributional
effects of efficiency-enhancing domestic policies.  By
internalizing to each country all of the external effects of
domestic policy, legislators are free to choose optimizing
domestic policies without regard for their strategic consequences
for international trade.32
Labor Protections and Humanitarian Concerns
   The analysis to this point has probably not been particularly
satisfying for those motivated by humanitarian concerns.  It is
morally meaningless to prohibit the domestic production of goods
by our own children if the end result is simply to import goods
produced by illiterate children in a neighboring country.  A
similar argument can also be made, albeit in a lower tone, about
goods produced by workers who receive low wages or work long
hours.
While it is undoubtedly the case that consumers in high-
income countries are genuinely concerned with the welfare of
foreign workers, it is not at all clear that these concerns can be
constructively addressed in the WTO by applying trade disciplines.
  To understand the role that the WTO might play in mediating
humanitarian concerns with the process of production, it is
important to distinguish between two different forms in which
these moral concerns might manifest themselves.
First, moral distaste may be a private good.  For example, a
consumer might prefer not to consume goods produced by children or
under poor working conditions. In this case, consumers ought to
have an opportunity to avoid goods produced in this manner,33
provided that they are willing to pay the additional cost of
production. In some cases, this might be accomplished by attaching
a product label detailing the conditions under which the good was
produced (Freeman, 1994). But one can also make a case that
countries that wish to do so should be allowed to include a broad
definition of immoral working conditions and, acting as a country,
refuse to import such goods.
However, this particular moral stance focuses only on
alleviating the bad feeling consumers have knowing they have
consumed a good produced under unpleasant circumstances.  The
welfare of the foreign workers themselves is not necessarily at
issue. But if consumers in high-income countries can exhaust their
moral commitments simply by avoiding consumption of goods produced
in ways that they dislike contemplating, without regard for the
welfare of the workers involved, then the humanitarian argument
begins to lose some of its moral gravity. If, by contrast,
humanitarian and moral concerns focus on the welfare of the
workers themselves, rather than on the discomfort of the consumer,
then the ability of trade sanctions imposed through the WTO to
address these concerns is highly limited. 
In fact, trade sanctions in the face of low labor standards
are as likely or even more likely to harm workers as they are to
improve working conditions. Maskus (1997) provides a detailed34
discussion of this point, which I draw upon throughout this
section.
Consider the problem of child labor in the case of a small
open economy in which the export sector is adult labor-intensive,
the import sector is capital-intensive, and a nontraded
intermediate input to the export sector is produced using child
labor.  The child's labor supply is increasing in the child's wage
and decreasing in the adult wage.  The marginal child worker is
the youngest, since the opportunity cost in terms of foregone
education falls as the child ages.
In this setting, a foreign tax imposed on goods produced by
children can lead to the social optimum in the sense of
internalizing the external effect of child work on the well-being
of western consumers.  Those children no longer working who
receive an education are also better off.  However, if, as a
consequence of the tax, the newly unemployed children live in a
household with lower income, less nutrition, and otherwise
diminished life alternatives, the trade sanction has probably been
counter-productive. Children who continue to work after the
imposition of the tax are definitely worse off, since the firms
who employ children have to pay a tax.  In a small open economy, a
tax must lower the after-tax wage of the working child.
A similar type of analysis can be applied to discrimination35
in employment. Suppose, for example, that the supply of female
workers is upward-sloping but there is a legally mandated ceiling
on the wages paid to female workers in the export sector.   A
foreign tariff imposed as a sanction against the offending
practice will lower the demand for the offending country's
exports.  By implication, the demand for female labor in the
export sector also declines.  Since the equilibrium wage for
female workers is now lower than before the sanctions were
imposed, firms will find it less costly than before to engage in
discrimination, thus making discrimination more likely.  Women, of
course, are made worse off in the process relative to male workers
since both their employment and wages have declined.
The foreign tariff will only be successful if the government
responds to the threat of sanctions by eliminating the
discriminatory practice.  However, the threat itself lacks
credibility in view of the fact that the tariff harms precisely
the group of workers who are already victimized.  A threat with
such adverse consequences could hardly be credible.
The threat of sanctions will be particularly ineffective if
the targeted country simply lacks the resources to respond to the
threat.  For example, Rogers and Swinnerton (1999) estimate that
if GDP per worker falls below $5020, families are so poor that
they cannot survive without contributions to family income from36
children.  Thus, no matter how intense the demand for a reduction
in child labor, child labor practices will continue.
Furthermore, trade sanctions do little to address the
underlying market failure that gives rise to offending labor
practices.  For example, capital market failure arguably lies at
the heart of the most egregious forms of child labor exploitation.
If parents had access to capital markets, they would school their
children while transferring wealth from the future to the present
by borrowing against their own future income or the future income
of their children (Baland and Robinson, 2000).  However, lacking
collateral and facing other capital market pathologies, the only
device parents have available to them is to put their children to
work.  The end result, of course, is inadequate human capital
formation.
Nor does it appear that legislating labor practices is likely
to be particularly effective when standards are not sensitive to
local community conditions.  For example, Krueger (1996) examines
the relationship between mandatory education and the actual age at
which children leave school.  In 1947, the United Kingdom raised
the age at which children could leave school from 14 years to 15.
 In 1973 the age was raised again from 15 to 16 years.  In both
cases, the modal age at which students left school adjusted with
the law.  By contrast, in Brazil, 80 percent of students leave37
school before the age of 13, even though school attendance is
mandatory through age 14.  In Mexico and Portugal, 25 percent of
students leave school before the legal age.  More generally, none
of the developing countries studied showed a spike in leaving
school at the compulsory age for doing so.
The decline in child labor in the United States between 1880
and 1910 suggests a similar pattern (Moehling, 1999).  In 1900,
twelve states had a minimum age law prohibiting work by children
under the age of 14 years.  By 1910, 32 states had enacted similar
legislation.  However, a review of the censuses taken in 1880,
1900 and 1910 suggest that the legislation had little effect on
the incidence of child labor.
More broadly, the difficulty in enforcing agreed-upon labor
standards has plagued the ILO since its inception.  Many countries
have ratified ILO Conventions pertaining to both core and other
labor practices, but have ultimately lacked the intention or the
resources to change their labor market conditions.
For example, many countries that have ratified ILO
Conventions pertaining to the right to organize and collective
bargaining maintain tight political control over union activity
(OECD, 1996). The main union federations in Jordan, Kenya,
Singapore and Taiwan are closely linked with the ruling parties. 
  More extremely, China, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Syria and Tanzania38
effectively permit only a single union structure and the right to
strike is severely circumscribed in many countries. 
Thus, while international pressure can lead to the passage of
stricter labor law, it is unclear to what extent the newly enacted
legislation will change the realities of the labor market in low-
income countries. If trade sanctions are actually employed in
pursuit of higher labor standards, the effect will often be to
hurt precisely those who are the focus of humanitarian concerns. 
Of course there are some cases in which sanctions by the
international community can be brought to bear against some more
egregious violations of broadly held humanitarian values. 
However, the routine use of trade sanctions or the threat of
sanctions imposed through the WTO does not seem an especially
promising mechanism for helping workers in low-income countries.
International Enforcement of Labor Standards
The weight of the argumentation above militates against
direct negotiation over labor standards in the WTO, leaving the
ILO as the main forum for discussion.  Labor rights activists
nevertheless argue in favor of some link between the ILO and the
WTO on labor issues in order to provide the ILO with enforcement39
power beyond its current practice of monitoring and providing
members with advice and technical support.
Countries who have ratified ILO Conventions are obligated to
regularly report on their compliance activities.  In addition, ILO
Article 24 allows employer’s and worker’s organizations to report
to the ILO on a state’s compliance and under ILO Article 26
another member of the ILO can bring evidence of a state’s failure
to comply with ratified Conventions. Moreover, Freedom-of-
Association complaints can be brought even against countries that
have not ratified Conventions 87 and 98.  In cases where problems
exist with compliance, the ILO begins a consultative process with
the Member government, providing technical support and drawing
press attention to the matter.
While the ILO may be effective in promoting discussion
between workers and Member governments, it has none of the
remedies available to members of the WTO.  For this reason,
linkage between the ILO and the WTO has been suggested as a way of
transferring some enforcement power on trade policy to labor
standards. 
Indeed, it is possible to link two separate issues in a
single agreement and, through that linkage, improve enforcement of
both issues.  Spagnolo (1999) considers the case in which two
governments are attempting to cooperate over two separate policy40
issues.  For our purposes, these two policy issues can be viewed
as tariffs and labor standards.  Both policy issues are
characterized by a prisoner's dilemma; that is, both countries
would gain if they could find a sustainable mechanism to cooperate
on lower tariffs and higher labor standards, but an inferior
outcome emerges in the absence of cooperation.
In a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation can be
self-enforcing if the benefit of defecting in any round of the
game is smaller than the cost of the punishment in all succeeding
rounds. Thus, one strategy for sustaining cooperation in a
repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a "trigger" strategy:
cooperate as long as the other party cooperates, but make clear
that if the other party ever defects, then there will be no future
cooperative behavior. When policy issues become linked in an
international agreement, defection on either tariff or labor
standards commitments will cause the entire agreement to collapse.
Employing linkage to raise the cost of defecting from either
tariff or labor standards commitments should help to sustain
compliance on both dimensions.
It is important to realize though that linking trade and
labor standards could slow the process of trade liberalization. 
Limao (2000) considers a case in which the international community
has found it relatively easy to achieve a nearly-optimal agreement41
on tariffs but has had greater difficulty finding a self-enforcing
agreement on labor standards.  If tariffs and labor standards are
linked together, the likely agreement would consist of less trade
liberalization but tighter labor standards than would have
occurred in a partitioned agreement.  Nevertheless, world welfare
is higher than in the absence of linkage because the gains from
improving the relatively inadequate labor standards are larger
than the losses from raising the already close-to-optimal tariff
levels.
However, as with most things in economics, the outcome
depends on the underlying assumptions.  Limao (2000) points out
that linkage can become counterproductive in the face of a
powerful lobby, which advocates in favor of producers in the
import-competing sector.  In this scenario, defection on the
tariff agreement by raising tariffs makes the import-competing
sector larger.  The larger is the import-competing sector the
greater the gain in producer surplus from subsequently relaxing
labor standards.  That is, when it comes to cheating, cheating in
labor standards and cheating in tariffs are complements when
producer surplus in the import-competing sector plays an important
role in the political process.  The consequent increase in the
returns to cheating makes defection on a linked agreement more
attractive when compared to two separate agreements. Thus, in this42




There is clearly a trend in global trade talks to extend
coverage beyond traditional tariffs, quotas and subsidies. During
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the purview
of the GATT process extended well past debate over tariffs to
include issues previously relegated to the domestic agenda, such
as intellectual property rights, competition policy, and
investment regulations. In each case, the argument is that trade
policies and domestic policies need to be negotiated
simultaneously if all policy tools are to be set optimally.
Labor standards have proved to be one of the most contentious
of the domestic policies considered for introduction into the WTO.
In spite of the “trade-relatedness” of labor market practices,
ultimately, the case for international labor standards mediated by
the WTO is problematic.
For those whose goal is to protect the wages of low-skilled
workers in high-income countries from import competition, it seems
unlikely that trade is the primary factor that has caused the
stagnant wages of low-skilled workers in recent decades.  Nor does43
it appear that harmonizing labor standards is a powerful tool for
improving the distribution of income in industrialized countries.
For those concerned with a race to the bottom in labor
standards, there is a strong case that efficiency can be achieved
without negotiating over labor standards directly. As long as
countries are required to adhere to market access commitments made
in a round of tariff negotiations, any subsequent change in
domestic policy that erodes that commitment must be offset with
additional tariff concessions.  If GATT Article XXIII is
interpreted and enforced in this way, it can be used to short-
circuit any motivation for setting labor standards strategically.
For those motivated by humanitarian concern over the plight
of workers in low-income countries, it is an uncomfortable reality
that trade sanctions leveled against countries with poor labor
practices may well hurt the very workers who are the intended
beneficiaries. Moreover, it is by no means clear that attempts to
use trade sanctions to enforce labor standards will strengthen
either trade or labor standards, at least not in a world of strong
political lobbies.
Heterogeneous labor standards across the world are a
legitimate source of policy concern. But it seems unlikely that
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